Working Papers

    Publications

    1. One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
      Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger
      In ITCS, 2026
      arXiv
    2. Contract Design for Sequential Actions
      Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger
      In SODA, 2026
      arXiv
    3. Budget-Feasible Contracts
      Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger
      In EC, 2025
      arXiv
    4. On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts
      Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger
      In ITCS, 2024
      arXiv Video