Working Papers

  1. Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types
    Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger
    In submission,
    arXiv
  2. Equal-Pay Contracts
    Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger
    In submission,
    arXiv

Publications

  1. One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
    Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger
    In ITCS, 2026
    arXiv
  2. Contract Design for Sequential Actions
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger
    In SODA, 2026
    arXiv
  3. Budget-Feasible Contracts
    Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, and Maya Schlesinger
    In EC, 2025
    arXiv
  4. On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts
    Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Maya Schlesinger
    In ITCS, 2024
    arXiv Video